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Abstract We measured changes in self and friend biases in
perceptual matching in young and older participants.
Participants learned associations between neutral geometric
shapes and three personal labels (You, Friend, or Stranger),
representing themselves, their named best friend, and a strang-
er not corresponding to anyone they knew. They then
responded whether the shapes and labels matched or mis-
matched. In addition, participants reported the perceived per-
sonal distance between themselves, their best friend, and a
stranger. Relative to young participants, older adults showed
an increased bias towardmatching their friends over strangers,
whereas the bias toward the self over friends tended to de-
crease. Equivalent results occurred for a perceived personal
distance measure, and, on measures of perceptual sensitivity
with older participants, the personal distance between friends
and strangers correlated with the friend bias in matching.
These results indicate that the social bias toward a familiar
best friend increases with age and modulates perceptual
matching.
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Considerable work has shown changes in cognition as peo-
ple age. Most typically, there are reductions in memory,
executive functions, and processing speed in older popula-
tions (Grady & Craik, 2000; Rabbitt, 1997; Salthouse,
2009), though more Bcrystallized^ functions such as lan-
guage tend to be preserved (Rabbitt, 1997). Changes in so-
cial cognitive functions as people age have been studied less
extensively. For example, there are reports that older people
have more difficulty seeing other people’s perspective in
Btheory of mind^ (ToM) tasks (Slessor, Phillips, & Bull,
2007, 2008). Older adults are also more affected by self-
related stimuli than younger participants, when asked to
memorize material (Mather & Carstensen, 2005; Trelle,
Henson, & Simons, 2015), consistent with lay reports that
older people become more self-absorbed and inward-
looking. These enhancing effects of self bias are found even
when comparisons are made under conditions in which the
stimuli are semantically encoded (Trelle et al., 2015), sug-
gesting that the effects do not simply reflect the depth of
processing. The reasons for these changes are unclear, how-
ever. For example, performance in ToM tasks is known to be
influenced by executive capacity (Apperly, Samson,
Chiavarino, & Humphreys, 2004), so the reduced ToM per-
formance in older adults may reflect less executive control
(Cavallini et al., 2015; Gutchess, Kensinger, & Schacter,
2010; Henry, Phillips, Ruffman, & Bailey, 2013; Shamay-
Tsoory & Aharon-Peretz, 2007). Alternatively, problems on
ToM tasks may be due to the increased saliency of self-
related knowledge, which is often pitted against the infor-
mation held by the other person in ToM tasks (e.g., in the
Sally-Anne task, in which the observer has knowledge of
where an object has been moved to, after a stooge has
walked out of a room; cf. Wimmer & Perner, 1983). It is
also unclear whether increased influences of self-related
information in memory reflect a strategic emphasis under
conditions of reduced memory capacity, or whether this re-
flects changes in self-related processing more generally.
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We set out to address these questions in a study on the effects
of aging on self-related processing and on the processing of other
people, in a simple perceptual-matching task that has previously
been shown to produce highly reliable biases favoring self-
related stimuli (Sui, He, & Humphreys, 2012) that are stable
across individuals over time (Humphreys & Sui, 2015; Stolte,
Humphreys, Yankouskaya, & Sui, 2015). We had young (<30
years) and two groups of older adults (60–69 and 69+ years)1
make associations between personal labels (You, Friend, and
Stranger) and neutral geometric shapes (square, circle, and trian-
gle), and they were told that the labels referred to themselves,
their best friend, or a stranger who was not anyone they knew.
Subsequently, participants either saw the original shape–label
pairs (e.g., square–you, circle–friend) or saw the stimuli re-
paired (e.g., square–friend, circle–you). The task was to decide
whether the stimuli were in their original pairing or had been re-
paired. Young participants show a large advantage for matching
self-related pairs (square–you) over stimuli that they associate
with their best friend (circle–friend), as well as an advantage for
friend-related stimuli over items associated with a stranger (trian-
gle–stranger; Sui et al., 2012). This self advantage increaseswhen
stimuli are perceptually degraded, suggesting enhanced percep-
tion for self-related stimuli. We asked whether this basic form of
self bias in the perceptual-matching task is modulated by age.
Previous work has consistently shown that memory in
young adults is better for self-related stimuli than for stim-
uli related to other people—the self-reference effect in memo-
ry (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Cunningham, Turk,
Macdonald, & Macrae, 2008; Symons & Johnson, 1997).
Recent research has shown that this self bias in memory is
maintained in older people, though they have reduced memo-
ry capacity in general (e.g., Gutchess Kensinger, & Schacter,
2010; Gutchess, Kensinger, Yoon, & Schacter, 2007).
Contrasting to past work on memory, in the present study
we tested the effect of aging on the perceptual-matching task.
One interesting aspect of the self-bias effect in perceptual
matching is that it is related to an underlying neural circuitry
(Sui, Rotshtein, & Humphreys, 2013). Notably, activation of
ventral brain regions is associated with self processing and
attention (respectively in the ventro-medial prefrontal cortex
[VMPFC] and the posterior superior temporal sulcus) when
self-related stimuli are presented, whereas enhanced activation
of a dorsal frontoparietal network is associated with attention-
al control when participants respond to stimuli related to
a stranger. These data indicate that attentional-control
processes are recruited more strongly in the latter condition
(see Sui & Humphreys, 2015a, for a discussion).
Additionally, neuropsychological studies have shown that
brain lesion over the VMPFC abolishes self biases in memory,
whereas brain damage in the dorsal attentional-control net-
work that spares the VMPFC generates abnormally large
biases toward self-related stimuli, due to an exaggerated
effect of strong attentional signals (Sui, Enock, Ralph, &
Humphreys, 2015). Researchers have argued that self-bias
effects are determined by the interaction between the ven-
tral network through the VMPFC and the dorsal
attentional-control network for control of behavior (Sui,
2016). From these findings, we may predict that self biases
in perceptual matching may increase as people age because
of a reduction in executive control, which should most
strongly affect responses to stimuli associated with
strangers.
On the other hand, work from the domain of social and
clinical psychology has suggested that changes in cogni-
tion in older adults can reflect strategic changes in process-
ing. For example, older adults appear to place more atten-
tional weight on positive relative to negative information,
leading to stronger positivity biases in memory than in
younger participants (Mather & Carstensen, 2005). Older
adults also show biases in social preference toward a small-
er number of familiar social partners, partly because of
strategic reflection on the lack of perceived time, as well
as greater response to the positive emotional associations
linked to such partners (Fung, Carstensen, & Lutz, 1999).
These results offer alternative hypotheses about how older
adults may vary in their perceptual matching for self,
friend, and stranger-related stimuli. For example, if aging
leads to an increased bias toward friend-related stimuli,
due to the weighting of positive emotion and familiarity,
it is possible that the friend advantage (relative to perfor-
mance with stimuli related to a stranger) may increase as
people age, whereas the self advantage (relative to the
friend) may actually decrease. This would contradict an
account based on the effects of decreasing executive func-
tion in older adults for the more difficult associations
(friend and stranger).
In summary, we assessed the effects of aging on self-
and other-related processing in the perceptual-matching
task. We would predict an enhancing effect of self biases
as people age, if reduced executive capacity affects re-
sponses to other-related stimuli in perceptual matching.
Alternatively if strategic changes in processing among
older adults modulate perceptual matching by increasing
the weight on positive emotions and familiarity linked to
close others, then we might expect an increased effect to
their best friend with a decreased bias to the self over
friends. To provide additional evidence on the latter pos-
sibility, we not only had participants carry out perceptual
matching, but also asked them to rate the perceived per-
sonal distances between themselves, their best friend, and
a (named) stranger. If aging biases processing toward a
1 70 was used as a cutoff age (60–69 vs. 69+ group), based on previous work
with a large sample suggesting that 70 may be the critical period for the
determinants of cognitive aging (Avlund, Kreiner, & Schultz-Larsen, 1993;
Gow & Mortensen, 2016).
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familiar friend, the judged personal distances from the self
to the friend and from the friend to a stranger might vary
across different age groups (the self distance from the
friend reducing and the friend distance from the stranger
increasing). Moreover, variations in perceived personal
distance may predict the self and friend biases on percep-
tual matching. This would provide converging evidence
for an effect of social coding, rather than executive func-
tions per se, modulating cognition in older adults.
Method
Participants
We recruited 103 participants in total, including 36 in the
young group (nine males, 27 females; ages 19–29 years,
mean age 22.08 ± 2.60 years), 33 participants in the 60–
69 group (16 males, 17 females; ages 61–69 years, mean
age 65.58 ± 2.42 years), and 34 participants (15 males, 19
females; ages 70–86 years, mean age 75.59 ± 4.69 years) in
the 69+ group. The sample size was determined from prior
studies in order to get a reasonable effect size (e.g.,
Humphreys & Sui, 2015; Sui et al., 2012). All participants
were right-handed and had normal or corrected-to-normal
vision. Informed consent was obtained from all participants
prior to the experiment according to procedures approved
by the ethics committee of the Medical Sciences Division
of Oxford University.
Stimuli and tasks
Three geometric shapes (triangle, circle, and square) were
assigned to three personal labels representing the participant,
his or her named best friend (whom he or she was asked to
name), and a stranger (he or she was asked to give a name that
was familiar but not held by any personal acquaintance). The
assignment of shapes to the different peoplewas counterbalanced
across participants. Before the experiment, participants were
asked to name one of their gender-matched best friends and to
select a gender-matched name as a stranger from a list of com-
mon names for people they did not know personally. The exper-
iment then began with a shape–person association instruction
presented on the screen. For example, participants were told that
Bthe triangle represents your best friend, Mary, the square repre-
sents yourself, and the circle represents a stranger, Lucy.^ The
order of the three shape–label assignments during the instruction
was counterbalanced across participants. The shape images were
not presented at this stage. The instruction took about 1 min.2
After the associative instruction, participants immediately per-
formed a shape–label matching task to judge whether a shape–
label pair matched. The same three shapes were used throughout
all of the experimental trials. A shape occupying 3.5° × 3.5° of
visual angle appeared above a white central fixation cross, 0.8° ×
0.8° of visual angle. One of three personal labels (You, Friend, or
Stranger, covering 1.76°/2.52° × 1.76° of visual angle) was
displayed below the fixation cross. The taskwas to decidewheth-
er the shape–label pair was the same one initially shown or
whether the shape and label had been re-paired. All stimuli were
displayed on a gray background. The E-Prime software (version
2.0) was used to present the stimuli and record responses. The
experimentwas run on a PCwith a 22-in.monitor (1,920 × 1,080
pixels) at 60 Hz.
Following the matching task, participants were required
to indicate the personal distance between any two people
by making two marks on a straight line on an A4 sheet (i.e.,
self and stranger, friend and stranger, self and friend), with
the physical distance between the marks (in millimeters)
serving as an index of the personal distance between the
individuals (see Fig. 2b in the Results, as well as Sui &
Humphreys, 2015b). The friend and the stranger referred
to those whom participants had named before the experi-
ment. There were ten trials per pairing; half the trials
started with one person (e.g., self–friend), and the other
half started with the other person (friend–self). To rule
out individual variations across the age groups, personal
distance (i.e., self–friend and friend–stranger) was also
scaled by the distance between the participant and the
stranger as relative scores (see Fig. 3 below). One partici-
pant in the 60–69 group and two participants in the 69+
group did not report personal distance.
Procedure
Participants completed the experiment individually in a
quiet testing room. For the matching task, participants were
instructed to associate one of three shapes with themselves,
their best friend, or a stranger. No images of stimuli were
displayed during the instruction stage (e.g., Bcircle = you,^
Bsquare = your best friend,^ Btriangle = a stranger^). After
the instruction, participants had to judge whether a simul-
taneously presented shape-and-label pair matched (Fig. 1).
Each trial started with a central fixation cross for 500 ms,
followed by a shape–label pair at the center of the screen,
for 100 ms for the young group and 500 ms for the older
participants. Half of the pairings of the shape and label
conformed to the instruction and were responded to as
match trials; on the remaining trials, the shapes and labels
were re-paired to form mismatch trials. For mismatch trials,
a shape was paired with each of the other two possible
labels (e.g., the self shape with either the friend or the
stranger label). The next frame was a blank field lasting
2 Previous studies have consistently shown that participants can immediately
learn shape–label associations after the instruction (e.g., Stolte et al., 2015; Sui
et al., 2012).
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1,000 ms for the young participants, or 3,000 ms for the old
participants.3 Participants were encouraged to make a re-
sponse as quickly and accurately as possible within this
interval by pressing one of the two keys on a keyboard with
the index or middle finger of the right hand. The order of
the response keys was counterbalanced across participants.
A feedback message (Correct, Incorrect, or Too Slow!) was
then given at the center of the screen for 500 ms.
Participants were also informed of their overall accuracy
at the end of each block. The experiment consisted of six
blocks of 60 trials each, following 24 practice trials.4 Thus,
there were 60 trials for each match and mismatch condition.
Data analysis
Raw scores (Fig. 1) For the behavioral measures, there was
no trade-off between reaction times (RTs) and accuracy for
any condition. The data on RTs and the d-prime results
(computed from performance on match trials contrasted
against mismatch trials with the same shape; see Sui et al.,
2012) are reported separately. The data analyses for RTs
were conducted separately for the match and mismatch tri-
als, due to the different responses being made in these cases
(e.g., Sui & Humphreys, 2014; Sun, Fuentes, Humphreys,
& Sui, 2016). Repeated measures analyses of variance
(ANOVAs) were conducted with Association (self, friend,
or stranger) as a within-subjects factor and Age (young, 60–
69, or 69+) as a between-subjects factor. For the measures
of self-reported personal distance, we conducted repeated
measures ANOVAs with Distance (self–friend, self–strang-
er, or friend–stranger) as a within-subjects factor and Age
(young, 60–69, or 69+) as a between-subjects factor.
Bias scores To assess changes in the self and friend biases
over age, as well as to rule out individual variation across
the three age groups, both the behavioral and self-reported
data were normalized. We conducted ANOVAs using nor-
malized bias scores with Bias (self vs. friend) as a within-
subjects factor and Age (young, 60–69, or 69+) as a
between-subjects factor. For RTs, the self bias was mea-
sured by the difference in performance for the self versus
the friend condition, divided by the sum across the two
conditions. The friend bias was indexed by the difference
in performance for the friend condition against the stranger
condition, divided by the sum across the two conditions.
The self bias was indexed by the differential scores relative
to the friend rather than the stranger condition so that we
could compare the differences between the self and friend
biases while controlling the familiarity effect. For d', the
self and friend biases were indexed by the differential
scores between the two conditions. For both RTs and d',
a larger score indicated a larger bias, whereas smaller
scores indicated a relatively a small bias. To normalize
self-reported personal distance, we computed the self–
friend distance scaled by the ratio of the participant–best
friend distance to the self–stranger distance; the friend–
stranger distance was measured by the ratio of the best
friend–stranger distance to the self–stranger distance. In
this case, a larger score indicated a greater relative person-
al distance between the two people, whereas a smaller
score indicates a relatively shorter personal distance.
There were similar patterns in RTs and in self-reported
personal distance (Fig. 2).
These bias scores were also used to calculate the relations
between the behavioral measures and the self-reported person-
al distance scores. We conducted Spearman correlation anal-
yses between the two types of measures. Given the ANOVA
results indicating differences between the young and older
participants, correlations were calculated for young and older
participants separately.
For all critical comparisons, Holm–Bonferroni corrections
at α = .05 were applied to all multiple comparisons (Holm,
1979).We report effect sizes using partial eta-squared (ηp
2) for
ANOVAs and Cohen’s dz for t tests (Lakens, 2013).
Results
Behavioral measures
Match and mismatch trials were analyzed separately, since
they reflect separate decision criteria (see Sui et al., 2012).
RTs in match trials: Absolute RTs The analysis of match
trials revealed a significant main effect of association, F(2,
200) = 44.62, p < .001, ηp
2 = .31, with faster responses to
the self than to friend-associated (p = .001) and stranger-
associated (p < .001) trials, and faster responses to the
friend than to stranger-associated trials (p < .001). We also
discovered a significant main effect of age, F(2, 100) =
22.38, p < .001, ηp
2 = .31, reflecting faster responses in
the young than in the 60–69 (p < .001) and 69+ (p < .001)
groups, as well as faster responses in the 60–69 than in the
69+ group (p = .03). The main effects were qualified by a
significant interaction between the association and age,
F(4, 200) = 3.99, p < .005, ηp
2 = .07 (Fig. 2a). The inter-
action was broken down for each of the three groups sep-
arately. The analysis in the young group showed a
3 The exposure durations and blank intervals differed across the age groups in
order to achieve comparable accuracies of the matching associations, which
were tested in a pilot session.
4 If older participants failed to complete the 24 practice trials, stimuli were then
presented on the screen until a response was made. In all, five out of the 34 in
the 69+ group and one out of the 33 in the 60–69 group made self-paced
responses. The accuracy data for these participants fell within the range of
the participants with a fixed duration, and therefore the data from all partici-
pants in each group were collapsed.
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significant effect of association, F(2, 70) = 60.44, p <
.001, ηp
2 = .63, with faster responses to the self than
to both friend-associated [t(35) = –8.62, p < .001, dz =
1.44] and stranger-associated [t(35) = –8.32, p < .001,
dz = 1.37] trials, and faster responses to the friend than
to stranger trials [t(35) = –2.79, p = .008, dz = 0.44].
We also found a significant effect of association in the
60–69 group, F(2, 64) = 20.32, p < .001, ηp
2 = .39.
Unlike in the young group, no difference in responses
emerged between the self and friend trials [t(32) = –
1.25, p = .22, dz = 0.22], but there were faster responses
to both the self [t(32) = –6.92, p < .001, dz = 1.21] and
friend [t(32) = –4.19, p = .001, dz = 0.73] trials than to
the stranger trials. Likewise, a significant effect of asso-
ciation was apparent in the 69+ group, F(2, 66) = 11.99,
p < .001, ηp
2 = .27, reflecting faster responses to the
self [t(33) = –3.88, p < .001, dz = 0.66] and friend
[t(33) = –3.85, p = .001, dz = 0.66] trials than to the
stranger trials, but we observed no difference in re-
sponses to the self and friend trials [t(33) = –1.85, p =
.07, dz = 0.32].
Bias measures Each of the biases was assessed across the
three age groups separately using normalized bias scores,
with Bias (self vs. friend; see the Method section) as a
Fig. 2 (a, b) Performance in perceptual matching as a function of age
(young, 60–69, or 69+) and association (self, friend, or stranger), shown
for absolute reaction times (a) and d' (b). (c) Absolute personal distance
measures as a function of age (young, 60–69, or 69+) and comparison
(self–friend, self–stranger, or friend–stranger). Error bars represent one
standard error
Fig. 1 Examples of the stimuli and trial procedure in the matching task.
A trial began with a 500-ms fixation displayed in the center of the screen,
followed by a shape–label pairing presented for 100 ms for young
participants or 500 ms for older individuals. The response deadlines
were 1,000 ms for young participants or 3,000 ms for older adults. A
500-ms feedback presentation was then given to indicate whether a
response was correct
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within-subjects factor and Age (young, 60–69, or 69+) as a
between-subjects factor. The normalized scores here equat-
ed to differences in baseline RTs across the age groups. The
analysis failed to show a significant main effect of either
bias or age, F(2, 100) = 1.14, p = .29; F(2, 100) = 2.08, p =
.13. However, we did observe a significant interaction be-
tween bias and age, F(2, 100) = 6.20, p = .003, ηp
2 = .11.
The between-subjects analysis failed to show significant
differences across the age groups in the self-bias effect,
F(2, 100) = 1.42, p = .25 (Fig. 3, upper left figure).
However, there was a significant effect of age for the friend
bias, F(2, 100) = 9.64, p < .001, ηp
2 = .16. Both the 60–69
[t(67) = 4.70, p < .001, dz = 1.13] and 69+ [t(68) = 3.06, p =
.003, dz = 0.73] groups showed larger friend biases than did
the young group, but we found no difference between the
60–69 and 69+ groups [t(65) = 1.49, p = .14, dz = 0.36]
(Fig. 3, upper right figure). These results indicated an en-
hanced friend bias with age.
To verify this result, we compared howmany participants
showed a larger self than friend bias within the young versus
the old (60–69 and 69+) groups. Relative to the older par-
ticipants (combining the 60–69 and 69+ age groups), young
participants were more likely to demonstrate a larger self
bias than a friend bias (83% of individuals in the young
group vs. 30% of individuals in the old groups), χ2 =
26.82, p < .001.
RTs on mismatch trials The analysis of mismatch trials did
not show either a significant main effect of association, F(2,
200) = 2.52, p = .08, ηp
2 = .03, or an interaction between
association and age, F(4, 200) = 0.85, p = .49, ηp
2 = .02.
However, a significant main effect of age, F(2, 200) =
21.23, p < .001, ηp
2 = .30, reflected faster responses in the
young than in either the 60–69 (p < .001) or the 69+ (p < .001)
group. No differences emerged between the 60–69 and 69+
groups (p = .46).
d-prime The analysis of d' showed a significant main effect of
association, F(2, 200) = 56.20, p < .001, ηp
2 = .36, with larger
d' scores for the self condition than for the friend (p < .001)
and stranger (p < .001) conditions, and a greater d' in the friend
than in the stranger condition (p < .001; Fig. 2b). However,
neither the main effect of age nor the interaction between
association and age was significant, F(2, 100) = 2.06, p =
.13, F(4, 200) = 1.46, p = .22.
In line with the RT data, we also conducted a chi-square
analysis for the numbers of participants with a large or a
small self bias relative to their friend bias. The analysis
Fig. 3 Patterns of self (vs. friend) and friend (vs. stranger) biases in
reaction times (RTs, top panel) and self-reported personal distance
(bottom panel). The plots on the left side represent self biases in RTs
(upper part) and in self-reported personal distance (lower part). The
plots on the right side represent friend biases in RTs (upper part) and
self-reported personal distance (lower part). Error bars represent one
standard error of the normalized differential scores
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showed that the participants in the young group were more
likely to have a large self bias (vs. friend bias; 81% of indi-
viduals in the young group) than were those in the old (60–
69 and 69+) groups (55% of individuals in those groups), χ2
= 6.53, p = .01.
Personal distance
Absolute distance The analysis demonstrated a significant
main effect of distance, F(2, 194) = 371.13, p < .001, ηp
2 =
.79; the rated distance was shorter for the self–friend com-
parison than for the self–stranger (p = .001) and friend–
stranger (p < .001) comparisons, and the rated distance
for friend–stranger was shorter than that for self–stranger
(p = .046). We also observed a significant main effect of
age, F(2, 97) = 9.49, p < .001, ηp
2 = .16; young individuals
reported larger personal distances than did the 60–69 (p <
.001) and 69+ (p = .015) groups, but there was no differ-
ence between the 60–69 than 69+ groups (p = .57). The
interaction between distance and age was marginal, F(4,
194) = 2.22,p = .068, ηp
2 = .07 (Fig. 2c).
In line with the RT analysis, this interaction was broken
down into the three age groups. The young group showed a
significant effect of distance, F(2, 70) = 124.57,p < .001, ηp
2 =
.78, with a larger distance in the self–stranger than in the self–
friend [t(35) = 13.32, p < .001, dz = 2.21] and friend–stranger
[t(35) = 4.32, p < .001, dz = 0.25] comparisons, and the dis-
tance was larger for the friend–stranger than for the self–friend
comparison [t(35) = 10.14, p < .001, dz = 2.56]. The effect of
distance was also significant in the 60–69 group, F(2, 62) =
102.37, p < .001, ηp
2 = .77. Unlike in the young group, no
difference in distance was apparent between self–stranger and
friend–stranger [t(31) = –0.33, p = .74, dz = 0.07], but the
distances were both larger for the self–stranger [t(31) =
10.28, p < .001, dz = 3.04] and friend–stranger [t(31) =
10.27, p < .001, dz = 3.47] comparisons than for the self–
friend comparison. Similarly, there was a significant effect
of distance in the 69+ group, F(2, 62) = 175.24, p < .001,
ηp
2 = .85. The distances were comparable for the self–stranger
and friend–stranger comparisons [t(31) = –1.31, p = .27, dz =
0.01], whereas there was a larger rated distance for the self–
stranger [t(31) = 13.60, p < .001, dz = 2.21] and friend–strang-
er [t(31) = 14.05, p < .001, dz = 2.19] comparisons than for the
self–friend comparison.
Bias scores To assess the aging effect on perceived person-
al distance, we conducted ANOVAs using relative distance
scores, normalized by the rated distance between the self
and the stranger (to equate for possible age differences in
the lengths of the scales used). The Bias in distance was a
within-subjects factor (self–friend vs. friend–stranger; see
the Method section), and Age was a between-subjects fac-
tor (young, 60–69, or 69+). We found a significant main
effect of distance, F(2, 97) = 167.35, p < .001, ηp
2 = .63,
reflecting a smaller distance in the self–friend than in the
friend–stranger comparison. The effect of age was also
significant, F(2, 97) = 14.06, p < .001, ηp
2 = .23, with
larger relative perceived personal distances in both the
60–69 (p < .001) and 69+ (p = .006) groups than in the
young group, but no difference between the 60–69 and
69+ groups (p = .15). We also observed a significant inter-
action between personal distance bias and age, F(2, 97) =
13.65, p < .001, ηp
2 = .22.
For the self–friend distance (the self-bias effect), there
was no significant effect of age, F(2, 97) = 1.84, p = .17
(Fig. 3, the lower left figure). In contrast, we did find a
significant effect of age for the friend–stranger distance
(the friend-bias effect), F(2, 97) = 13.86, p < .001, ηp
2 =
.22: Older participants in both the 60–69 [t(66) = 5.46, p <
.001, dz = 1.33] and 69+ [t(66) = 3.85, p < .001, dz = 0.94]
groups assigned a greater distance between their best
friend and the stranger than did the young participants
[we found no difference between the 60–69 and 69+
groups; t(62) = 1.620, p = .11, dz = 0.041] (Fig. 3, lower
right figure). These results indicated an enhanced per-
ceived friend–stranger distance, whereas the self–friend
distance was maintained over age.
There were similar patterns in both RTs and self-reported
personal distance (Fig. 3). Next, we conducted correlation
analyses to assess the relations between these two types of
measures.
Correlations between behavioral measures and personal
distance
We conducted correlation analyses for young and older (60–
69 and 69+) participants separately. We calculated correla-
tions between the friend and self biases in normalized behav-
ioral scores (for both friend–stranger and self–friend) and
personal distance (friend–stranger/self–stranger and self–
friend/self–stranger) (see the Method section). For d',
Spearman correlation analyses in the young participants
failed to show any indication of significant correlations be-
tween the behavioral biases and perceived personal distance,
rs = –.01 and –.06, ps = .96 and .73, for the friend and self
biases, respectively (Fig. 4, upper panel). In contrast, for the
older group, we observed a significant positive correlation
between the behavioral friend bias and perceived friend–
stranger distance, r = .36, p = .003 (Fig. 4, lower left plot);
older adults who tended to show a larger reported personal
distance between friends and strangers also showed greater
increases in perceptual sensitivity in matching friend- over
stranger-associated shapes. However, no significant correla-
tion was apparent in self biases, r = .05, p = .72 (Fig. 4, lower
right panel). For RTs, no significant correlations appeared
for either the young or the older groups, ps > .36
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Discussion
The results showed that self-bias effects on perceptual
matching were at least maintained across the age range (when
bias effects were normalized for absolute RTs; but in terms of
absolute RTs, self biases over familiar friends decreased with
age). These data on perceptual matching were paralleled by
the findings when participants rated the personal distance be-
tween themselves, their familiar friend, and a named stranger.
The perceived distance between the self and the friend was
maintained across the age groups (Fig. 3). This runs counter to
the view that exacerbated executive demands on older partic-
ipants reduce matching performance on other-related stimuli,
and thus increase the self-bias effect (cf. Sui & Humphreys,
2015a), but these findings in perceptual matching are consis-
tent with prior studies of the self-referential effect on memory
(Gutchess et al., 2010; Gutchess et al., 2007), suggesting
maintained effects of self-reference at different stages of pro-
cessing more generally.
On the other hand, older participants showed larger friend
biases than did younger participants (against a baseline of re-
sponses to strangers). This result in terms of the friend bias is
consistent with the view that, relative to younger participants,
older individuals tend to weigh familiar friends more in their
perceptual judgments. It may also reflect an enhanced familiar-
ity of their friends. Older participants are likely to have known
their best friend for longer than younger participants, and the
strength of the response to the friend may depend on the famil-
iarity of the person. A further possibility (not mutually exclu-
sive) is that older participants may show a more positive emo-
tional response to their best friend partly because older individ-
uals weight positive emotional value higher than do younger
participants (Fung et al., 1999; Mather & Carstensen, 2005). A
positive emotional response to the friend association may en-
hance the friend bias (see Stolte et al., 2015). Consistent with
these results reflecting the social coding of friend relative to
stranger stimuli, we found that the rated personal distance of
the best friend from the stranger increased with age.
Additionally, we observed a correlation between the friend bias
(friend–stranger) in the d' measure in perceptual matching and
the rated perceptual distance between the friend and the strang-
er: Individuals who rated the friend as being more distant from
the stranger also showed a larger bias in their sensitivity when
matching friend over stranger stimuli in perceptual matching.
Aron and colleagues proposed that individuals use close rela-
tionships to achieve self-expansion through the inclusion of
others in the self (Aron, Aron, & Norman, 2001; Aron, Aron,
& Smollan, 1992). The present results are in line with the view
Fig. 4 Spearman correlations between normalized differential scores in
d' and self-reported personal distance. (a) For the young group, no
significant correlations are apparent in either friend bias (upper left plot)
or self bias (upper right plot). (b) For the older group, a significant
positive correlation can be seen in friend bias (lower left plot), but not
in self bias (lower right plot)
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that older participants favor their best friend more than do
young adults. The increased inclusion of the friend in the self
in older adults, then, may lead to a larger rated personal dis-
tance between the friend and the stranger, and a larger bias
toward the friend over stranger stimuli in the matching task,
but this was contradicted by the maintained self bias (vs. the
friend) in perceptual matching, although the bias toward the
self over friends did tend to decrease with age (see Fig. 3, upper
left plot). We found no other direct relationships between per-
ceived personal distance and biases in perceptual matching.We
conclude that both the rating of personal distance and the sen-
sitivity in perceptual matching are modulated by the social
coding of the friend relative to the stranger, which changes as
people age. In contrast, biases toward the self in perceptual
matching do not increase with age.
A somewhat different account of the changes in self- and
friend-related processing in older people is based on interfer-
ence effects.5 Because it has been shown that older adults are
more susceptible to the effects of proactive interference
(Bowles & Salthouse, 2003; Emery, Hale, & Myerson,
2008), their maintained self bias and enhanced friend bias
may stem from an increased proactive interference across tri-
als in older people. For example, built-up interference may be
stronger from self- and friend-related trials (trial n – 1) to
stranger-related trials (trial n) than is the interference from
stranger-related trials (trial n – 1) to self- and friend-related
trials (trial n). However, the design of the present study did not
allow for such analyses. These ideas may be tested in the
future by formal analyses of carryover effects.
Though there are reductions in social-cognitive capacities
(e.g., seeing other people’s perspectives in ToM tasks) as well
as in cognitive functions (e.g., memory and executive control
functions) in older people, the present results confirm that the
basic form of self bias in perceptual matching is preserved as
people age. This is consistent with evidence from previous
work in the memory domain (e.g., recall, recognition, and
source memory) showing a maintained self advantage in mem-
ory among older participants (Gutchess et al., 2010; Gutchess
et al., 2007; Hamami, Serbun, & Gutchess, 2011; Mueller,
Wonderlich, & Dugan, 1986; Rosa & Gutchess, 2011; Yang,
Truong, Fuss, & Bislimovic, 2012). Importantly, we also found
an enhancing effect of the friend bias in perceptual matching,
which correlated with the perceived personal distance between
friends and strangers. These results have broad implications for
understanding social behavior in older people. For example,
they can help explain why older adults become more selective
toward familiar friends when asked to make social judgments
(Fredrickson & Carstensen, 1990), since cognitive biases to-
ward familiar friends would be reinforced by enhanced percep-
tion and attention to these individuals and to the information
associated with them.
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